# Early Warning Indicators for Asia

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#### Characteristics: Asian Countries


- 1, Bank-oriented financial system
- 2, Relatively stable banking system
- 3, small share of bond markets
  Needs for long term financing
- 4, Lack of long term investors such as pension funds and insurance companies
- 4, High percentage of Small & Medium Sized Enterprises (SME)
- 5, Large share or Micro Credit (Finance companies), Lack of venture capital

**Bond Pensions** Government **Bond Market** and Infrastructure Governmen **Insurance Finance Ordinary** Large **Companies** Banks FIs for SMEs **SMEs** S Micro credit Finance companies **Venture Venture Capital** business Hometown Investment Trust Funds


## Structure of the paper

- 1, Easy monetary policy and Too much liquidity
- 2, Inconsistency between micro behavior of banks and aggregated macro behavior of banks
- 3, Early warning indicators for the bubble
- 4, Estimation of Banking Behavior Japan and USA
- 5, Supply of Risk capital
  Hometown Investment Trust Funds
- 6, Deposit Insurance


#### **Growth rate of M2 (USA)**









### Interest Rate (FFR) (USA)



# 1. Ease Monetary Policy before the Bubble Interest Rate and Money Supply of Japan




#### Japan: Share Price, Land Price, Bank Loans




#### US bank Loans, stock price and land price




## **FBank Credit / GDP J Ratio**



# Micro behavior of bank and aggregated macro effect





<u>Japan's Bubble (1986 – 1990)</u>

U.S. Bubble (2002 – 2006)

<u>Japan's post bubble (1991 – 2001)</u>

**U.S. post bubble (2007 – 2010)** 

- (1) Individual bank loan supply
  - (i) based on its own demand for loans
  - (ii) A bank expects future housing price based on lagged housing price

$$P_{H}^{e}(t)=f(P_{H}(t-1), P_{H}(t-2),...)$$
  
 $S_{H}(t)=S_{H}(P_{H}(t-1), P_{H}(t-2), P_{H}^{e}(t))$ 

(2) Housing price keeps on going up

$$\Delta P_{H} = \hbar \{D_{H}(Y,r,P_{H}(t),P_{H}^{e}(t))-S_{H}(P_{H}(t-1),P_{H}(t-2),P_{H}^{e}\}$$

- (3) All the banks increase their loan supply
- (4) Aggregate loans supply goes up  $\{=\Sigma S_H(t)\}$
- (5) Housing price starts to fall

# Bubble Indicators Bank based financial Market of Asia

(i)the ratio of banks' real estate-related loans to the loans of banks overall, In Japan, this ratio rose from 16% to 32.6%,

$$L_H > L_{total}$$

(ii) Comparison of the pace of growth in banks' real estate lending with the real economic growth rate,

$$\frac{\Delta L_H}{L_H} > \frac{\Delta Y}{Y}$$

(iii) The rise in the housing prices compared with the average income of workers

$$P_H > \alpha Y$$

#### Ratio of Real Estate Loans to Total Loans

GDP Y

$$Y = F(K, N, K_H) = K^{\alpha} N^{\beta} K_L^{\gamma}$$

K : bank loan supply (excluding real estate)

N : labor supply

-  $K_L$ : real estate loan supply

$$\frac{\Delta Y}{Y} = \alpha \left(\frac{\Delta K}{K}\right) + \beta \left(\frac{\Delta N}{N}\right) + \gamma \left(\frac{\Delta K_L}{K_L}\right)$$

GDP growth rate = bank loan supply + labor supply + real estate loan supply

# Simple two period model

$$\max_{c_1, c_2, H} U(c_1, c_2, H) = \sum_{t=1}^{2} \beta^{t-1} u_t(c_t, H)$$

$$u(c_t, H) = \ln c_t + \ln H$$

$$Y_2 = (1 + g)Y_1$$

$$P_H^e(2) = (1 + \theta)P_H(1)$$

$$c_1 = P_H(1) \times H = Y_1 + L$$


$$c_2 + (1 + r)L = Y_2 + P_H^e(2) \times H$$


Housing price/Income ratio

s.t.


$$\frac{P_H(1)}{Y} = \frac{(1+r) + (1+g)}{r - \theta}$$

# Growth Rate of Banking Loan to Housing Sector (USA)










#### Japanese Housing Price/National Income



1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 200<del>9</del>9

#### **US Housing Price/Income**




Table 1: Loan Supply Function f			
or Japanese Banks	Period I	Period II	
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are t-values.	(1982–1989)	(1990–1995)	
	Loans <sub>it</sub>	Loans <sub>it</sub>	
Deposits_it	0.6	58	
	(19.	69)	
Market Share <sub>it</sub>	0.4	26	
	(1.4	18)	
(Loan rate – Call Rate)	16.298	21.351	
	(2.611)	3.028)	
$Call\ Rate_t$	8.564	6.755	
	(2.568)	2.904)	
BIS Ratio <sub>it</sub>	8.658		
	(-2.353)		
$Competitors' Total Loans_{it-1}$	0.066	0.038	
	(3.675)	(2.333)	
Land Price <sub>t</sub>	0.123	<b>−1.760</b>	
	(2.546)	-1.449)	
Constant	-36.302		
	(-0.874)		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.8	92	
Hausman Statistic, CHI-SQUARE	0.923		
P-Value	0.8	20	

## **Bank Loan Supply**

USA

• • •		
Difference Rate <sub>t</sub>	6.13E+08***	
Loan Rate - FF Rate	(4.30)	
$FFRate_t$	-1.51E+06**	
	(-2.34)	
Deposits <sub>it</sub>	0.28***	
	(3.52)	
Competitors' Total Loans <sub>it</sub> _	-0.22***	
	(-4.53)	
Housing Index $_t$	1.23E+06***	
	(4.69)	
Constant	-1.99E+09***	
	(-4.31)	
Number of Observations	320	
Adjusted R2	0.5701	23

#### **Typical Profit-Maximizing and Actual Loan Amounts**






Figure 2. Actual profits  $(\pi_I^a, \pi_{II}^a)$  and maximum profits  $(\pi^*)$ .

#### **Non-performing Loans in Japan**




## Non-performing Loans in US

#### Non-Performing Loans



# Balance of Liability Reserves/Retained Loss Deposit Insurance



-3.8

-4.0

-3.1

-3.5

-3.0

25

-1.9

-0.1

-1.2

40.4

0.9

0.4

-0.3 0.1


-0.9

# Financial Assistance in the Resolution of Failed Financial (as of March 31, 2011).


(Unit: billion yen)

Come control.					, , ,
Fiscal year	Number of cases	Monetary grants	Asset purchases	Lending	Debt assumption
1992	2	20.0	_	8.0	_
1993	2	45.9	_	_	_
1994	2	42.5	_	_	_
1995	3	600.8	_	_	_
1996	6	1,315.8	90.0	_	_
1997	7	152.4	239.1	_	4.0
1998	30	2,674.1	2,681.5	_	_
1999	20	4,637.4	1,304.4	_	_
2000	20	5,154.6	850.1	_	_
2001	37	1,639.4	406.4	_	_
2002	51	2,325.5	794.9	_	_
2003	0	_	_	_	_
2004	0	_	_	_	_
2005	0	_	_	_	_
2006	0		_	_	_
2007	0	ı	_	_	_
2008	1	256.3	1.7	_	_
2009	0	_	_	_	_
2010	0	_	_	_	_
Total	181	18,864.8	6,368.0	8.0	4.0

# Recent Money Flow of Japan



Investment funding provision to higher risk projects through banks' OTC selling of regional investment trust funds







# Examples of Hometown Trust Funds by Internet in Japan; E-fund 1, Solar Power Panel

- 2, Japanese Sake (=Japanese wine) producers' fund
- 3, Fishing Boat fund
- 4, SME---Shark fin, Seaweed
- 5, Wind Power Generator fund
- 6, Green Finance

# Donation and Investment to community











# Japanese wine (Japanese Sake) Fund



# Investors Large Projects and Professional Investors


Pension Funds
Insurance companies
Mutual Funds

**Community Type Infrastructure** 

Wind power Generator Funds Japanese Wine Fund

**SME** finance

Figure 6.3. Revenue bond schemes in Asia



#### Reference

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